ITP 9,3 32 zones of influence both to the initial development of modern accounting in Scotland and England, its subsequent spread through other Anglophone cultures and the effect of alternative models on the emergence of spheres of influence. Their own attempt at classification presents UK and US influenced alternatives as well as tax-based and law-based approaches. Evans et al. (1985) report that the first professional discussion of the harmonization of accounting practices took place in 1904 and that these objectives are still being pursued actively (see The Economist, 1995) . This degree of institutional inertia suggests that regional variations in practices will continue to compromise technical interoperability for some time to come.
Business environments: task and institutional
Organization theory provides a contingency view of task environment management as an activity protecting the central work processes through buffering strategies and the management of the relationship with the task environment as a social and political system, dealt with through bridging strategies (Thompson, 1967) . The task oriented view sees the environment as a source of inputs, markets for outputs, competition and regulation. According to Thompson, the technical core strives for technical rationality, even though it exists in an open, natural system requiring environmental transactions. Managers and departments in an organization exist to buffer the technical core and work at the managerial level requires an appreciation of conflict and motivation given by a natural systems approach. This involves an appreciation of the variety of human resources as an essential ingredient. The institutional level of the organization must manage external relationships with other organizations in the environment, so it must embrace an open systems view.
This view is of value to information system designers. Technical design and development are engrossing activities. Creativity and innovation require an immersion in process, but there is an ever present danger that the intrinsic challenge of a particular technical sub-goal may loosen any grasp of the overall implications of technical decisions for the organization as a whole. Such suboptimization is well understood in general systems theory, and placed in the context of information systems by Galbraith (1977) . Scott (1987) distinguishes between the task environment of organizations and their institutional environment. He points out that the latter is a relatively recent concern of organization theorists, and requires very different responses from the better understood task environment. In a sense organizations are seen to become institutions when they develop distinctive characters, or cultural values. A developmental perspective might suggest therefore that early in their existence, organizations would be more dominated by technical processes and that over time they may come to reflect institutional processes. Selznick (1957) accounts for the institutionalization of organizations in terms of organic growth and the emergence of distinctive character or culture over time.
Within business and industrial sectors, organizations will become more alike over time, as they draw on a common institutional framework. This view goes Cross-cultural information systems 33 some way to explaining Stinchcombe's (1965) finding that age of establishment of an industry was a much better predictor of an organization's characteristics than the age of the individual organization itself. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) identify three mechanisms which lead to isomorphism: coercive isomorphism associated with political influence and legitimacy, mimetic isomorphism stemming from standard responses to uncertainty, normative isomorphism associates with professionalization.
Examples of institutional and technical adjustment
The evaluation of the outcomes of technical initiatives such as information systems development requires a framework that acknowledges the coexistence of technical and institutional dimensions in organizations. The technical development process cannot be isolated from the everyday concerns of organizational survival without compromising its product, nor can managers and clients expect a free technical fix for institutional problems. A metatechnical approach implies that managerial and institutional concerns are also technical and therefore any framework embracing both design and its organizational context is meta-technical. It presupposes a systems view of design and its place in the organization, but not a consensual one. Open systems theory argues that explanatory variables must be as varied as the phenomena they seek to explain. The contingency approach to organization theory argues that organizations whose internal features best match the demands of their technologies or their task environments can be expected to be most effective. However, contingency models can overlook the issue of equifinality: different conditions and causes may give rise to the same outcomes. It should be remembered that "the effectiveness of an organization is a sociopolitical question" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974) . Nevertheless, little is said about real interests of participants and groups. There may be real benefits for actors in promoting sub-optimizing decisions which otherwise appear to limit efficiency and effectiveness.
Power relations may be well entrenched and difficult to counter, extending to the institutional level of cognition. Douglas (1987) , in discussing "how institutions think", suggests that they play a key role in establishing and maintaining rationalities by providing cognitive economy and removing larger contextual issues from the arena of discussion. She argues that the high triumph of institutional thinking is to make the institutions appear invisible and this invisibility can compound the difficulty of getting an expanded context accepted within any established institutional and organizational framework. Clegg (1987) makes an important distinction between the established view of uncertainty as a contingency and the use of uncertainty in support of the exercise of power, illustrating the point with the ambiguity evident in the interpretation of building contracts by the actors involved in the construction process. It may be argued that the former understanding is apparent in a task orientation, the latter in an institutional orientation. ITP 9,3
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Four studies, one a borrowed reworking of a classic, furnish some insight into the dynamics discussed above. Each examines the relationship between technical development and innovation and concurrent attempts to reinstitutionalize an organization in the face of a new political and institutional environment. Awareness of the nature of the simultaneous institutional shifts is a key to the outcomes of these technical initiatives, demonstrating the limitations of a purely technocratic view.
TVA: re-institutionalization in a regional agency Couto (1983 Couto ( , 1988 ) examines changes in post-war policies of the Tennessee Valley Authority from the perspectives of Gouldner's metaphysical pathos (1955) . Selznick (1949) had analysed TVA policy in terms of co-optation as a means of survival in a potentially hostile environment, rather than an altruistic philosophy. Couto plots the period following Selznick's study of the implementation of the original New Deal programme, and reports changes in policy which emerged during the 1950s. He shows that unintended consequences reflecting priorities which placed economic development above the needs of the weaker sections of the community, escalated to the point where the TVA reneged on its commitment to balanced regional development. Instead the Authority pursued a future as a large scale producer of cheap electricity. This led to intervention in the process of coal production in several coalfields, and involvement at the leading edge of technical development of both coal-fired and nuclear power generation. An institutional perspective reveals the logic of these changes.
After 1948 the TVA had to deal with an increasingly hostile Congress and a changing political climate with the onset of the Cold War. Couto argues that a new mission was rationalized around the role of the organization both as a demonstrator of best technical practice for private electricity producers and as a supplier to key Federal defence establishments. Couto is concerned with the impact of nationally derived policy at an economic periphery, and the effective subversion of an agency charged with the task of addressing regional inequities. Boje et al. (1982) cite the TVA of Selznick's period of observation as an organization able to maintain and conceal political interests through the use of a myth of benevolence. Couto shows that as the power and effectiveness of this myth declined, an alternative was developed. In pursuing a strategy of organizational survival, the TVA used technical innovation in conjunction with its geographical resources to develop complementary roles as large-scale supplier of power to the military-industrial complex, and public sector exemplar of efficient practice. This process of re-institutionalization (Jepperson, 1991) led to an expensive excursion into nuclear generation during the 1960s, justified in part by the environmental damage wrought by its own policies of the 1950s. Little (1987 Little ( , 1988 describes the extended development cycle of a sophisticated computer-aided architectural design (CAAD) system serving a Cross-cultural information systems 35 company (Buildco) which was established by the British government in 1937 to provide housing in support of the relief of economically depressed regions. As with the TVA, recourse to technical innovation has been made at several points during Buildco's history. The locus of this innovation shifted from methods of production towards those of housing management as the focus of activity moved from the production to the management and ultimately sale of housing stock, in response to the changing concerns of central government.
Buildco: technical innovation in public sector construction
Around 1960 growing concerns with lack of detailed technical control of design standards displaced the immediate post-war concern with volume of output. A high degree of integration was possible because the company's own internal building department was handling some 50 per cent of the construction workload. Where external consultant designers were used their contribution was guided by the framework of a standard house type range, to which they frequently contributed, and by standardization of specification and details. During the 1970s an ambitious CAAD development commenced, in conjunction with a University-based research group. However, during the late 1970s both the size and character of Buildco's workload underwent rapid change. Capital resources were increasingly required to modernize the ageing post-war stock to current standards of amenity and performance to maintain its viability. At the same time an increasing concern for the general condition of housing in inner-city areas led to the re-allocation by central government of New Town resources to an extensive inner city renewal programme. IMF intervention in the UK economy in 1976 led to much closer cost control, through the introduction of annual cash limits. This meant that the relative priorities of projects had to be more carefully assessed, with as much attention paid to the patterns of spending implied as to total expenditure.
As a consequence, new construction projects were frequently concerned with redevelopment sites and the CAAD system could address only a proportion of new-build work, itself a declining proportion of capital expenditure. Further expenditure on the development of the system became difficult to justify. Although some work was carried out to assess the feasibility of using the system on comprehensive modernization schemes, the design content of this work was also declining as a result of changing government policies.
As the computing industry as a whole became more mature, the development of sophisticated software for individual users was becoming prohibitively expensive in relation to increasingly available general commercial packages. The close relationship between Buildco and the CAAD research group, involving interchange of staff and refinement of the software at the company, restricted the general commercial appeal of the system. The relatively uncommon hardware on which the system was mounted also caused difficulties. It frustrated attempts to support development costs through income from sales and made transfer to more modern and economical platforms impractical.
Railco: a failed innovation
Railco is a transport undertaking formed by the merger of a federal government agency with two state-based organizations. The innovation in question was the pilot implementation of an expert system which, while achieving some technical success, was not implemented by the organization. In 1987 the vendors of the organization's mainframe computer demonstrated an expert systems development shell at its Users' Conference and in 1988 the organization was successful with its proposal to act as a trial site for the development of an expert system application against competition from other organizations in the same state capital. The computer vendor provided hardware, software and personnel support for the company.
Expert systems represent a sub-set of knowledge-based computer applications which have developed from a number of strands of interest within artificial intelligence research from the 1950s to the 1970s. The simplest definition of an expert system is as a computer program which does what an expert does and they have been advanced as a direct replacement for human cognition.
Railco's successful proposal was for an expert system for the rostering of operations staff, but this was changed to locomotive rostering. Utilizing a rapid prototyping methodology developed by the vendor an initial demonstration prototype for main-line locomotives was completed and presented after some eight weeks of work. However, over a year of development for operational systems followed. The overheads of familiarization with both a novel software environment and a novel development task supporting a sophisticated process meant that this first component took longer than expected. In addition, during development working practices were altered in ways that reduced the scale of the rostering task itself, with branch workings reduced, and shunt workings being reallocated to main-line locomotives, thus removing the need for the pilot application.
The size of the development team varied between one and four workers but the development method required a considerable input from the domain expert, who was not available for normal duties during that time, although the first module to be trialled did provide him with more time. Early in 1989 the development was abandoned.
Steelco: successful innovation and diffusion
Steelco is the steel-making division of a multi-divisional company. Here the consequences of a pilot application similar to Railco's led to further development work, although the nature and intent of expert systems were adjusted in the light institutional dynamics.
Several laboratories are operated by the company. Individual plants retain their own technical development staff for operational development, but longer term issues which may be common to a number of sites are dealt with by appropriate research laboratory. One of these also provides research and innovation support for information systems and technology. The data Cross-cultural information systems
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processing departments of the entire organization were merged in 1990 to form an information technology division, providing a rechargeable service to other divisions, and offering external consultancy services. However, innovative IT applications remained the responsibility of research laboratories which are able to evaluate new technology and offer it to potential user divisions on a trial basis.
Between 1984 and 1985 a pilot expert system was developed in conjunction with the chief operator of the sinter plant at one of the company's steel making locations. The plant prepared material for feeding into blast furnaces for iron production. The expert system was developed to capture the skill of an expert who was due to retire.
A pilot system was developed running on a Macintosh microcomputer. Given the nature of the plant, which took fractions of an hour to respond to any change in control settings, the relatively slow response time of this modest platform was not a problem.
This initial development was seen by laboratory staff as a way of demonstrating the capabilities within the steel-making process, prior to negotiating projects for the more central and critical blast-furnace processes. Although equivalent operations were carried out at a number of sites operated by different product divisions (e.g. sheet and coil, rod and bar), differing practices and different ages of plant within and between sites meant that transfer of systems between sites was not a trivial undertaking.
This application led to the development of a number of process control and scheduling applications; however, the diffusion of total quality management (TQM) approaches during the development of the pilot also led to a marked change in emphasis in the use of expert systems, and for subsequent initiatives. Instead of mimicking the best available expert, in the classic expert systems sense, they were directed to the provision of electronic standard practices in conjunction with the introduction of the TQM approach to production units. These applications were developed as "operator guidance" or decision support systems, rather than replacements for human expertise.
By the time a second sinter system was under development at a second production site, total quality management practices were in place and instead of knowledge-acquisition interviews with an expert, written standard operating procedures were used to build the knowledge base for the system. User reaction to the pilot expert system meant that a greater emphasis was placed on the commitment of end users to the project, and the communal development of a knowledge base through the establishment of standard practices.
Standards versus uncertainty
The case studies outlined above present a stark view of the uncertainty facing organizations engaged in technical innovation at the cutting edge of key technologies. They are discussed in more detail below, in relation to varying outcomes in the process of technical diffusion. However, the key ingredient in success and failure in them has revolved around the issue of standards.
With the advent of TQM in Steelco, or the excessive overheads of nonstandard software development environment at Railco, the standards involved pertain to the organization itself. They may also erupt from the organization's environment to undermine previously secure decisions, as with the regulatory problems of TVA nuclear power stations, and competition from relatively unsophisticated de facto standards for the CAD systems painstakingly developed by Buildco.
A compromise between consensus and cutting edge capability is involved in the agreement of any standards. The redefinition of expert systems objectives at Steelco is one such compromise. Swann (1995) demonstrates elegantly that officially agreed standards in a maturing technology will always lag behind state-of-the-art capability through the delay inevitable in reaching and communicating consensus. The employment of standards also presents users and suppliers with a set of trade-offs, as indicated by Figure 1.
Both de facto and official standards have been used as mechanisms for defining, bounding and segmenting the marketplace. Any standard implies an acceptance of some common denominator across a range of circumstances. For officially determined standards, these denominators must be the lowest and most inclusive available. In fast developing fields of technology this may mean abandoning the cutting edge and closing the boundary of the decision space available to users of the technology. In terms of the OSI layered model of computer communication, discussed below, such official standards have impacted at the lowest levels where the least design discretion exists. De facto standards begin to dominate at the higher levels where greater elaboration and differentiation is possible.
Technical focus versus cultural focus
Standards, whether for hardware, software or procedures, have long been regarded as the appropriate means of achieving inter-operability among organizations and are one obvious response to increasing globalization. Cross-cultural information systems
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However, standards themselves cannot solve the problems confronting information managers, whether they are established users of information technology or more recent adopters. The standards currently promoted reflect an established view of office automation as the transformation of the technical infrastructure of the workplace, the office rather than the facilitation of the activities and relationships of office-holders. This established, technocratic approach is linear and convergent, focusing on hardware issues. Explicit and implicit learning through the development of both computerized and manual information systems produces a legacy of understanding within organizations which is not captured by this approach. Instead it is seen as lag or resistance to change. There is a degree of cultural appreciation at the technical level of information systems design, as evidenced by research into Computer Supported Collaborative Work (CSCW) (e.g. Ishii, 1993) , but integration with the organizational level of a host culture would require the more social view of human computer interaction promoted by Suchman (1986) .
Official standards versus de facto standards
Official standards may be about market definition and closure, as in the case of television broadcast standards and subject to national and international governmental agreement. The de facto standards which arise from among industry players are different in nature and in intent. They are about capture and maintenance of market share. They may use official standards as a starting point, but will incorporate a more open aspect to allow further technical developments to be incorporated within a changing envelope and a developing decision space. Developers of technology must chose between attempting to establish a de facto standard within a market or simply following such a standard created by another player. The cost of following is always to be reacting to an emerging standard, the prize for leading is to be able to shape the development of the market itself. The key, however, is the capture of sufficient market share to make a standard both viable and plausible to potential adopters. In order to achieve this, individual developers have formed alliances to promote an agreed approach. However, achievement of market share is no guarantee of continued success. Many de facto software standards have been leapfrogged by continued rapid growth in the market itself and have ultimately failed. Okot-Uma (1988) presents a matrix to represent the varying levels of capability in information technology that exists between developing countries within the British Commonwealth. Such a model, reflecting Nolan's earlier work (Nolan, 1979) , demonstrates the need for suppliers to address the capabilities of users. If advanced technologies are prematurely deployed, they will fail. A backfrogging option, related to concepts of appropriate technology is presented as an equally necessary strategy to leapfrogging the competition.
User perspectives
As indicated by Figure 1 , adopters of standards have different concerns from developers. They are looking for functionality and certainty. However, in addition to capturing early adopters through technical excellence, developers must provide access for late adopters, if market share is to grow. Competitors will be using similar access paths to attract customers, so a standard must develop to match emerging features and functionality, even if these are not demanded by established customers. The gain to any customer from moving to a rival must always be kept below the cost of abandoning the adopted standard. Thus de facto standards are in constant flux as additional functionality is brought to established products, undermining the certainty sought by users. The middle strategy for smaller developers of establishing niche markets for specialized standards is also under constant threat as increasing functionality in mainstream products such as word processors and spreadsheets reduces the space for specialized desk top publishing or simulation software.
Standards are intended to achieve economy and inter-operability. The notion of inter-operability can be applied to each level of interaction within and between organizations. The OSI model of layers of communication offer a paradigm which is useful in the context of office automation in a globalizing economy in its structure of progressive levels. Each must be matched between systems, but with increasing latitude at higher levels. Effective inter-operability in globalized, trans-cultural systems requires a new understanding of both the standards incorporated into systems and the criteria by which their performance is judged. The concept of standards must be extended beyond the technical infrastructure of such systems to their user characteristics and cultural dimensions. Similarly the established concepts of lifecycle and cost must be extended beyond the physical components of the systems in question, and beyond the costs of training direct users to assess the broader impact of both the introduction and the withdrawal of a system on its organizational setting. However, for this to happen, the dynamics involved in the creation of both officially sanctioned standards and emergent, de facto standards must be considered.
Bottom up, cultural change
The rapid growth in desk-top and end user computing during the 1980s brought about a number of profound changes in the character of organizational information systems. The dramatic reduction of cost and consequently wider availability of computing resources led to a process of commodification, initially of the hardware platforms courtesy of the open architecture of the de facto IBM standard clone, then of the operating systems and increasingly of the basic components of business software.
For the providers of technical support within organizations these changes represented a profound shift in the balance and the character of interaction within organizations. The bottom up consensual requirement of emerging client server architectures was more suited to organizational cultures which Cross-cultural information systems
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incorporate consensual decision-making process such as ringi (see Ohsumi, 1991) than those built around the technocratic project of centralized control. This change in paradigm is reflected in the teaching of computing in business and accounting education and can be expressed is represented in Figure 2 which is derived from Kaye and Nicholson (1992) .
While the move to client-server architectures so far represents a direct, diagonal shift from provider to user orientation, the providers might prefer a move to the top right quadrant, on the grounds that without their guidance the users would inevitably fall into the bottom left quadrant.
Information technology as commodity
The emergence of a market for end-user oriented software packages is an aspect of the shift from mainframe technology to desk-top provision of computing resources within user organizations. This involved a cultural change from centralized control of complex software mediated by a technocracy to direct user contact with the technology, producing a new generation of end users which is placing different demands on developers. The indeterminate nature of emergent, de facto standards means that users have some leverage though the feedback they have provided to developers. Implicit knowledge developed by users may produce insights into products which were not available to the developers. At the crudest level this implicit knowledge may convert a bug into a feature which is then documented, but at higher levels of sophistication concepts such as user-defined style sheets may evolve from the pattern of use emerging among the developer's clientele. However, the focus remains technical, with the layering or wrapping of cultural concerns around a technical core. This means that a technical dynamic still dominates development. While users can develop their own market advantage through their own organizational standards, they are still constrained by a technical momentum which leads 
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them to scavenge the margins of functionality for peripheral features suited to their requirements, just as minority user groups must utilize marginal aspects of mainstream applications to their advantage. A focus on the cultural requirements, and the differences between organizational and cultural contexts is needed to bring the double advantage of both user-focused development and an awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of particular traditions and approaches. Burris (1993) plots the emergence of a technocratic frame in Western development from the enlightenment through the industrial revolution to Taylorist scientific management to Veblen's "soviet of technicians". She argues that the technocratic rationality is the dominant paradigm for workplace organization, polarizing the internal labour market and favouring abstract diagnostic and technical activities. This paradigm carries with it a range of implicit cultural assumptions, which imply that the global diffusion of western technology is a substantively rational and inevitable process.
Beyond a rational systems view
The technocratic perspective sees cultural variation as either irrational or insignificant and not as a resource. Technocracy is gender and culture blind and incapable of acknowledging cultural differences, understanding of which is critical to smooth inter-operability. Instead a technocratic perspective sees a smooth migration of older techniques to less industrialized countries, while the core economies refine advanced technologies. There is already considerable evidence against such a simplistic view and Burris suggests that Reich (1992) demonstrates a better recognition of global implications for core economies, although still exhibiting a bias towards the expert sector. This bias allows optimistic interpretations of the impact of technologies by focusing on the beneficiaries within the workforce, rather than the affected workforce as a whole.
Despite the claims of technocracy, there is a popular appreciation that systemic problems occur within complex organizations and there are widespread expectations of dysfunction, particularly at large and impersonal scales of organization. Typically, Peter (1986) talks of growth in levels of bureaucratic control as "proliferating pathology". The concept of organizational pathology has also been used by several organization theorists to account for unintended outcomes and outputs from organizations. References to underlying concepts can be identified in works ranging from Parkinson's Law via Up the Organization to Brooks' "mythical man-month" (Brooks, 1975) .
Achieving a single rationality across any complex organizational setting remains problematic. Brubaker (1984) points out that Max Weber utilizes no fewer than 16 apparent meanings of "rational" in his writings (see Weber, 1947) . There is, nevertheless, a central concern with the irreconcilable tension between formal and substantive rationality. According to Weber, the modern economy has a double rationality: subjectively rational, and thus purely instrumental, market transactions guided by objectively rational, and thus Cross-cultural information systems 43 purely quantitive calculations. Formal rationality is concerned with calculability of means and procedures and ultimately with efficiency. Substantive rationality addresses the value of ends and results and is ultimately concerned with effectiveness.
Non-western cultures and globalization
Global economic integration is growing rapidly, although the precise implications of this growth are subject to debate. The acceleration of this growth has been facilitated in part by information and communication technologies which are supporting organizations that span national and regional cultures. These cultural differences then become intra-organizational differences, as a consequence, information systems reflecting different cultural assumptions must interact effectively. Beyond the core of Western technical development and diffusion lie a number of economies of growing significance subject to a parallel development, modified by successive inward infusions of technology from the west. In North East Asia a number of economies have been relatively late adopters of many facets of office automation because of a range of cultural differences, not least their use of non-Roman characters. Haywood (1995) outlines the complexity of the development of the western alphabets and Shepard (1993) , writing from direct experience, sets out the technical complexities of networking in an environment that must move beyond the ASCII standard. The situation is in some ways comparable to the technical handicap suffered by Western Europe before the adoption of Arabic numerals. Littleton and Yamsey (1978) emphasize the role of Arabic numerals in facilitating the emergence of the basis for western accounting practices during the fifteenth century. In conjunction with secular literacy, this technical innovation allowed a range of economic developments such as credit, capital and property rights to find expression in the development of written accounts.
In North East Asia computer support for numerical and scientific tasks may have reached levels comparable with the west, but the lack of support for nonRoman text so reduced any advantages over established manual systems that office automation has been selective and partial. Such countries have made extensive and effective use of a subset of office automation technologies such as fax and telephone that do not incorporate the requirement of a specific alphabet. Castells and Hall (1994) argue that the development of the fax was driven by a Japanese desire to promote a technology which did not disadvantage them over western users.
The sophisticated bit-mapping technology able to deal with ideographic text has emerged relatively late in the process of global diffusion of desktop computing. This means that these increasingly significant players in the world economy are operating in a technical context and to sets of standards, official and de facto, which have been shaped by outside cultural assumptions. Stinchcombe (1965) argues that the industry to which an organization belongs is a strong determinant of organizational structure and culture. Comparison of the age of an industry with its technological base suggests a related argument that core technologies reflect the age of an industry rather than that of any individual enterprise within it. This technically determined line of argument would suggest in turn that an emergent isomorphism should characterize the successive diffusion of the current generation of information technologies across separate industries. Indeed, notions of networked and postmodern organizations imply such an isomorphism. However, a cultural orientation would imply an expectation that inherently different outcomes would accompany the diffusion of the same technology to different regional settings. Orru et al. (1991) reveal strikingly different forms of intra-societal isomorphism among the relatively new industries of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Martinez et al. (1992) similarly demonstrate that the notion of Latin America conflates a range of distinctive cultural and economic conditions which will provide a different ranking of attractiveness to outside investors, depending on which criteria are compared. Kagami (1992) identifies a technology gap between centre and periphery as responsible for the inability of peripheral economies to absorb surplus agricultural labour, thereby creating low wage conditions conducive to less capital intensive production that at the centre. The World Bank (1987) classifies national economies by their trade orientation, identifying an increase in outward orientation between the early 1970s and early 1980s, with the strongly outward oriented countries performing best. However, Landau (1986) in a study of government policies towards economic growth suggests that no simple relationship between government policies, or share of manufacturing in GDP and growth rate exists.
Regional, national and industrial cultures
The tendency to conflate intra-regional complexity into concepts such as Latin America or Asian Tigers reflects the process of imperial, technical and more recently information colonization by the more technically developed nations. In this context it is as well to remember that US President Truman thought it unlikely that the Soviet Union would develop nuclear weapons, since they were an Asiatic nation (York, 1976) . Haywood (1995) draws attention to the pervasive nature and potentially destabilizing presence of mass communications from the industrialized core in the most remote communities. Such colonization is a potent vehicle for the diffusion of practices from the centre to the periphery, as indicated by Haywood's mapping of the continued dominance of English, Spanish and Portuguese as both mother tongues and official languages in areas of former colonization. However, one legacy of this primarily European colonization is an overlay of differing cultures in already diverse regions such as Africa and South America.
Given that no clear prescription for success exists across an increasingly globalized world economy, individual enterprises are faced with the need to Cross-cultural information systems
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develop strategies which will minimize the difficulty of inter-regional and intercultural transactions.
Culture and organization
There is a cultural dimension to the established practice and expectations within organizations which imparts its own dynamic to the process of change and development. Grounded, longitudinal observation offers access to this dynamic (Badham et al. 1995; Glaser and Strauss; , however, a complex issue has been further confused by the variety of ways in which culture has been formulated by different writers on organizations. One conception of organizational culture has been used to explain the relative success of individual organizations and entrepreneurs (Peters and Waterman, 1982) . Other writers refer to culture in terms of national differences in social and economic organization. Latin, Anglo-Saxon and traditional cultures are reflected in distinctive organizational types identified in studies examined by Lammers and Hickson (1979) . Turner (1971) describes industrial subcultures which can be identified across individual organizations, and are distinctive from the larger society, Eldridge and Crombie (1974) define organizational culture as characteristic for individual organizations while Strauss et al. (1973) describe a range of cultures within a single organization. Thompson (1967) utilized the concept of an organizational constituency capable of entering into coalition with other constituencies in order to promote its interest. Such a conception allows the formal elements of an organization to be related to the informal communication and negotiation which often modifies, or in extreme cases frustrates, the intentions of management. It also allows consideration of intra-organizational variations in culture, arising from these differences of interest and experience.
Similarly, differences in institutional culture can be identified at national levels. Johnson (1983) defines a market rationality as seen in the US where the state is interested in maintaining, through regulation, the mechanisms of competition in order to maximize efficiency. He contrasts this with a plan rationality as seen in Japan where a close working relationship exists between industrial sectors and government departments such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in order to pursue common goals with maximum effectiveness. He argues that this essentially different view of the role of public institutions in the economic arena accounts for a great deal of misunderstanding between these trading partners as to what constitutes fair trade. The variation in cultural attitudes to the balance between pre-competitive and competitive activities is considerable. Okimoto (1989) and Fransman (1990) illustrate the Japanese approach, key components of which would fall outside legally permitted cooperation in both North America and Australasia.
Diffusion: institutional and technical dynamics
The cases outlined in this paper demonstrate the necessity of an institutional perspective on technical strategy. All organizations conducted significant ITP 9,3 46 technical innovation against a background of institutional realignment as political conditions and consequently resources, shifted. The redefinitions of the organizational mission of the TVA, identified by Couto, reflect political and economic changes stemming from the Second World War. The lifecycle of organizational myths proposed by Boje et al. (1982) can be seen to be derived from changes in their explanatory power within the organization and its environment. The core technology of TVA was changing at the same time.
Changes in Buildco's policy can be related to post-war changes in the development and construction industry in the UK and elsewhere. Russell (1983) indicates a range of pressures behind the move to increase both industrialization and capitalization in the building industries of East and West in this period. The factory environment was seen as free from the natural, seasonal variation and disruption of the building site. A technocratic underpinning for designers and architects had been laid in the 1920s and 1930s, within the Modern Movement theorists. The ideology was already available when economic and political conditions became favourable. To combine Boje et al.'s (1982) and Rosenberg and Frischtak's (1984) terms, the myth was in place, awaiting the favourable macro-economic conditions of post-war reconstruction. This particular myth incorporated a belief in forms of architectural determinism which minimized the significance of exogenous political and cultural conditions. However, when resources again became scarce, a shift in focus equivalent to that of the TVA took place in Buildco. Development and construction was replaced by management and ultimately disposal of housing stock. The technical focus shifted from the production methods used in the construction of housing, through the rationalization of control over technical standards, to a concern with management information systems, and the co-ordination of the resources required to maintain this existing housing stock. Delays caused by technical control led to extensive short-circuiting of the formal reporting processes intended to capture and respond to feedback from the construction process. Problems were communicated through anecdote instead of formal memoranda.
The core technologies involved were changing out of synchronization with their environment, CAAD technology was not fully available until the conditions it was intended to address had changed. By this time the CAAD developers were perceived as a remote technocratic priesthood. Delays in delivery of promised improvements in software led some user groups to develop a great enthusiasm for micro-computers as soon as these were available. After considerable resistance, the technical staff agreed a standard based on an 8-bit machine, shortly before the release of the 16-bit IBM Personal Computer in the UK which quickly established a de facto standard for business applications generally.
In Railco a strategic planning exercise focused on the information systems groups and represented an evaluation of structures and responsibilities in relation to identified objectives and commitments by external consultants. A Cross-cultural information systems
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corresponding exercise in Steelco developed a comparable ten-year horizon for IT to identify priorities and necessary resources. The Railco pilot was intended to make a substantial contribution to a core activity, but continuing rationalization of operations impacted directly on the operations targeted by this pilot, revised operating and maintenance procedures reduced or removed the task of rostering locomotives for shunt and local trip workings. This change was a symptom of a substantial reinstitutionalization of the organization, connected to a Federal government national freight strategy which was to transform the organization over the three years following initial contact with the organization. The technical constituency was dominated by traditional view of railways and their social role in national development, the operating division was already aligning with world best practice, anticipating the forthcoming changes and promoting a cultural shift to a streamlined and focused bulk transportation service. In such an environment, a technical project based on established and traditional practices was doomed. Despite the withdrawal of support for further expert system development, however, experience of the prototyping approach to software development influenced subsequent projects.
In Steelco, the adoption of TQM practices created an opportunity for expert systems to be repackaged as electronic standard practices. While the pilot implementation had been chosen with a view to gaining access to the more central steel-making processes, the goals of the system were revised from a classic expert system replacing human expertise to one of decision support. This allowed the link to TQM practice, offering the required consistency of performance, but at the cost of a simplification of the original technical objectives. In effect expert systems were reinnovated at a less ambitious, more familiar level of technology, utilizing an operator assistance paradigm within the TQM context. Reduction of variance became the selling point for expert systems technology. In contrast, the task addressed by the pilot project in Railco remained the classic expert system strategy applied to a task which became increasingly marginalized. The development team remained strongly committed to the innovative technology following their success against strong competition for vendor support. Unfortunately their adherence to sound but conservative risk minimization practices allowed further scope for their marginalization while a higher risk strategy aimed directly at a key functional area could have delivered a more critical function more quickly. Resources were redirected before development could be completed and the functionality of delivered material was the subject of disagreement between technical and operational staff. Arguably a high profile innovation supporting functions perceived by the operating division to be anachronistic was seen as a challenge to the process of reinstitutionalization at Railco. Significantly by the end of the three-year period of observation all the technical staff involved in the pilot scheme had exited the organization, as was observed earlier in Buildco.
Drives to diffusion
The case studies reveal the difficulty in reconciling a technically focused innovation process with changing institutional environments of organizations. The very framework for the definition of appropriate or adequate performance is liable to change, creating an insoluble problem of defining appropriate measures for shifting performance targets.
The organizations described in the case studies had all been influenced by developments and practices in comparable organizations in other countries. The TVA was accused by its critics of too closely approximating development in the Soviet Union, Buildco imported Scandinavian construction techniques to the UK before the Second World War. In Australia the federal government pursued an aggressive policy of tariff reduction and exposure of manufacturing industries to direct competition for over a decade in order to promote regional and global competitiveness (see Marceau et al. 1992) . Railco paid attention to North American rail undertakings in particular in its bid to match world best practice and Steelco frequently referred to Du Pont as an appropriate benchmark for their organization as a whole.
Such relationships between organizations seeking technical innovation have been noted in the literature on the diffusion of technology. Both institutional and technical aspects of diffusion of technology between organizations are subsumed in the S-Curve representation discussed by Rogers (1983) . Strang and Meyer (1994) distinguish between diffusion: "flows among formally autonomous units" and implementation: "flows among hierarchically placed units". Complex organizations, such as Steelco, are faced with internal diffusion. Organizations which seek to diffuse centrally developed systems must either accommodate intra-organizational cultural differences, or demand that end user groups adapt to the technology. In particular, organizations which have developed through the acquisition and merger of a variety of extant systems must achieve more than purely technical inter-operability. As has been argued above, technical systems reflecting different cultural assumptions must interact effectively. Figure 3 presents two dynamics of diffusion. In the first, an initial adopter, Organization A undertakes a technical development on the basis of the needs of the organization at time T1. This technology is deployed in the organization at time T2 at which point the organization itself has developed institutionally through interaction with its environment. In order for the technology, based on a snapshot of the organization at T1 to be usefully developed the organization must enter into a period of adjustment between the delivered system and the changed needs. We have seen that in Steelco institutional development in the organization led to a major reassessment of the innovative technology, in Railco to its abandonment. Sauer (1993) suggests that such processes of adjustment of both function and performance criteria need to be continuous through the development and life of a system for it to retain the support of its users. The complex technical systems examined by Sauer do not achieve the final routinization or institutionalization described by Rogers (1983) .
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Organization A reaches the beginning of its payback period on the innovation at T3. Organization B, having observed A's process of deployment initiates its own development of the new technology at T3. In order to adapt the technology to their own needs they pursue a process of redevelopment, followed by their own process of adjustment, so that payback for Organization B begins at T5. Organization C pursues a more adventurous strategy, however, by deciding to adopt the technology as soon as it is aware of Organization B's adoption decision. In this stage of diffusion, however, Organization C is faced with a task of reverse-engineering rather than re-developing the technology since it does not have the example of B to follow. The benefit of the higher risk comes in the earlier arrival at the payback period, however, since C has not waited for its model, B to achieve a deployable technology. Meanwhile Organization A has already embarked on its own process of redevelopment following continued change within its requirements. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) suggest that mimetic adoption is used in situations where means-ends links in a new technology are unclear. A higher risk is involved for the adopter, since reverse engineering is required rather than the reinvention of a more orderly transfer of technology. Examples of both forms of diffusion are contained in Morris-Suzuki's (1994) review of Japanese technical development. During the nineteenth century some innovation decisions were made on little more knowledge of the technology in question than that of its existence and efficacy in Western industry. More recently such decisions have been made with a high level of direct assistance from overseas. In the contemporary situation some of the risks of mimetic innovation can be reduced through the adoption or development of standards.
Identifying advantages and selecting partners
Imperfections in globalization offer the same potential advantages and pitfalls to actors as imperfections in any other market. Okimoto (1989) argues that the ability of Japanese companies to develop their activities through networks of independent subsidiaries, rather than through direct expansion of the core business allows flexibility through the persistence of a dual economy. MorrisSuzuki (1994) notes an increasing tendency for sub-contractors to upgrade their skills and technology, with the manufacture of more basic components shifting off-shore. The opportunity for glocal ization, as practised by Japanese corporations (Morris, 1991) means adapting global approaches to local situations.
Smaller players might well be advised to think locally and act globally. Clegg (1990) presents the Benetton company as a paradigm for the networked postmodern organization with its conscious dependence on a core information system linking complementary networks of subcontracted producers and franchized retail outlets. Benetton has combined the specific strengths of a regional location in Northern Italy with a global strategy to achieve decentralized growth without dilution of an essentially family business structure.
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Conclusion Granovetter (1973) explains why it is the least used connections in a social network which often provide the most valuable information. Kelly (1994) argues that robust responses to complex, changing environments require organizational heterogeneity which can be derived from the peripheral and marginal players. Information technologies are reducing transaction costs and altering the relative advantages and economies of scale. A complex process of layering of labour markets at several levels of skill and remuneration can be observed, with smaller companies able to leverage their position through their ability to absorb technology more quickly and completely than larger enterprises. In response to uncritically optimistic scenarios based on such capabilities, Burris (1993) presents a view of bifurcation of internal and external labour markets resulting from the harnessing of information technologies to technocratic imperatives. In her critique of emerging technocracy she argues that the "informated organization" (Zuboff, 1988) can co-exist with a fundamentally deskilling automation strategy within a single organization. For enterprises of every size, however, successful exploitation of the opportunities arising in such conditions will require careful attention to standards for inter-operability at technical and cultural levels. Key innovations in business information technology have succeeded because they were able to map on to existing cultural assumptions. Thus the spreadsheet could readily mimic the twenty-column analysis paper already in use. Word processors could offer a flexibly automated form of the standard correspondence already developed by many enterprises. Database applications, on the other hand have remained a technocratic innovation. Their reliance on enterprise level data to achieve significant leverage places them in the upper right quadrant of Figure 2 . Sproull and Kiesler (1991) demonstrate that a process of organizational learning is needed to move beyond the technical effects of direct substitution of information technology for manual processes. The transformative gains in effectiveness represented by Zuboff's informated organization will come about only through an understanding of the meaning of cultural inter-operability at both pre-competitive and competitive stages of development. Such understanding is more likely to arise from the learning process accompanying institutional or mimetic adoption than through a purely technically driven diffusion process.
In the post-Cold War era, global economic integration is growing rapidly, and disparate national and regional cultures are increasingly interacting within rather than across organizations. While the decisions facing organizational actors are not that different from those dealt with in the past, they will be critical to the character of the drives to innovation emerging in specific organizations. Figure 3 represents the difference in diffusion trajectories produced by organizational variations in risk perception and management. Variations in strategy reflect the institutional and cultural nexus of organizations, both at the micro-level of the individual organization, the meso level of its sector or industry and the macro level of national or regional context. Effective interaction among increasingly networked organizations will require the accommodation of such variety through the pursuit of cultural interoperability within constantly developing standards.
